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Abstract
Since Alan Turing envisioned Artificial Intelligence (AI) [1], a major driving force behind techni-
cal progress has been competition with human cognition. Historical milestones have been frequently
associated with computers matching or outperforming humans in difficult cognitive tasks (e.g. face
recognition [2], personality classification [3], driving cars [4], or playing video games [5]), or defeat-
ing humans in strategic zero-sum encounters (e.g. Chess [6], Checkers [7], Jeopardy! [8], Poker [9], or
Go [10]). In contrast, less attention has been given to developing autonomous machines that establish
mutually cooperative relationships with people who may not share the machine’s preferences. A main
challenge has been that human cooperation does not require sheer computational power, but rather relies
on intuition [11], cultural norms [12], emotions and signals [13, 14, 15, 16], and pre-evolved dispositions
toward cooperation [17], common-sense mechanisms that are difficult to encode in machines for arbi-
trary contexts. Here, we combine a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm with novel mechanisms
for generating and acting on signals to produce a new learning algorithm that cooperates with people
and other machines at levels that rival human cooperation in a variety of two-player repeated stochastic
games. This is the first general-purpose algorithm that is capable, given a description of a previously
unseen game environment, of learning to cooperate with people within short timescales in scenarios pre-
viously unanticipated by algorithm designers. This is achieved without complex opponent modeling or
higher-order theories of mind, thus showing that flexible, fast, and general human-machine cooperation
is computationally achievable using a non-trivial, but ultimately simple, set of algorithmic mechanisms.
∗Correspondence should be addressed to crandall@cs.byu.edu and irahwan@mit.edu
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1 Introduction
The emergence of driverless cars, autonomous trading algorithms, and autonomous drone technologies high-
light a larger trend in which artificial intelligence (AI) is enabling machines to autonomously carry out com-
plex tasks on behalf of their human stakeholders. To effectively represent their stakeholders in many tasks,
these autonomous machines must repeatedly interact with other people and machines that do not fully share
the same goals and preferences. While the majority of AI milestones have focused on developing human-
level wherewithal to compete with people [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], most scenarios in which AI must interact with
people and other machines are not zero-sum interactions. As such, AI must also have the ability to cooper-
ate, even in the midst of conflicting interests and threats of being exploited. Our goal is to understand how
to build AI algorithms that cooperate with people and other machines at levels that rival human cooperation
in arbitrary two-player repeated interactions.
Algorithms capable of forming cooperative relationships with people and other machines in arbitrary
scenarios are not easy to come by. A successful algorithm must satisfy several conditions. First, it must
not be domain-specific – it must have superior performance in a wide variety of scenarios (generality). Sec-
ond, the algorithm must learn to establish effective relationships with people and machines without prior
knowledge of associates’ behaviors (flexibility). To do this, it must be able to deter potentially exploitative
behavior from its partner and, when beneficial, determine how to elicit cooperation from a (potentially dis-
trustful) partner who might be disinclined to cooperate. Third, when associating with people, the algorithm
must learn effective behavior within very short timescales – i.e., within only a few rounds of interaction
(learning speed). These requirements create many technical challenges (see SI.A.2), the sum of which often
causes AI algorithms to fail to cooperate, even when doing so would be beneficial in the long run.
In addition to these computational challenges, human-AI cooperation is difficult due to differences in
the way that humans and machines reason. While AI relies on computationally intensive search and ran-
dom exploration to generate strategic behavior, human cooperation appears to rely on intuition [11], cultural
norms [12], emotions and signals [13, 14], and pre-evolved dispositions toward cooperation [17]. In particu-
lar, cheap talk (i.e., costless signals) is important to human cooperation in repeated interactions [15, 16], as it
helps people coordinate quickly on desirable equilibrium and create shared representations [18, 19, 20, 21].
As such, in addition to generating strategic behavior, we consider that AI algorithms must generate and
respond to costless signals at levels that are conducive to human understanding.
2 Results
The primary contribution of this work is the development and analysis of a new learning system that cou-
ples a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm with novel mechanisms for generating and responding to
signals. Via extensive simulations and user studies, we show that this learning system learns to establish and
maintain effective relationships with people and other machines in a wide-variety of repeated interactions
at levels that rival human cooperation. In so doing, we also investigate the algorithmic mechanisms that are
responsible for its success.
2.1 Cooperating with People and Other Machines
Over the last several decades, algorithms for generating strategic behavior in repeated games have been de-
veloped in many disciplines, including economics, evolutionary biology, and the AI and machine-learning
communities. To begin to evaluate the ability of these algorithms to forge successful cooperative relation-
ships, we selected and evaluated 25 representative algorithms from these fields, including classical algo-
rithms such as (generalized) generous tit-for-tat (i.e., GODFATHER) and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) [39],
evolutionarily evolved memory-one and memory-two stochastic strategies [40], machine-learning algo-
rithms (including reinforcement learning), belief-based algorithms [41], and expert algorithms [42, 43].
Via extensive simulations, we compared these algorithms with respect to six different performance metrics
(see SI.B.2) across the periodic table of 2x2 games [37] (see Methods and SI.A.3).
The results of this evaluation, which are overviewed in Methods (see Figure 6 in particular) and are de-
scribed in detailed in SI.B, demonstrate the difficulty of developing algorithms that can forge effective long-
term relationships in many different scenarios. The results show that only S++ [43] was a top-performing
algorithm across all metrics at all game lengths when associating with other algorithms. However, despite
its fast learning speeds and its success in interacting with other machines in many different scenarios, S++
does not, in its current form, consistently forge cooperate relationships with people (SI.D), though it does
cooperate with people as frequently as people cooperate with each other in the same studies. Thus, none of
these existing algorithms establishes effective long-term relationships with both people and machines.
We hypothesized that S++’s inability to consistently learn to cooperate with people appears to be tied to
its inability to generate and respond to costless signals. Humans are known for their ability to effectively
coordinate on cooperative equilibria using costless signals called cheap talk [15, 16]. However, while sig-
naling comes naturally to humans, the same cannot be said of sophisticated AI algorithms, such as machine-
learning algorithms. To be useful, costless signals should be connected with behavioral processes. Unfor-
tunately, most machine-learning algorithms have low-level internal representations that are often not easily
expressed in terms of high-level behavior, especially in arbitrary scenarios. As such, it is not obvious how
these algorithms can be used to generate and respond to costless signals at levels that people understand.
Fortuitously, unlike typical machine-learning algorithms, the internal structure of S++ provides a clear,
high-level representation of the algorithm’s dynamic strategy that can be described in terms of the dynamics
of the underlying experts. Since each expert encodes a high-level philosophy, S++ could potentially be used
to generate signals (i.e., cheap talk) that describe its intentionality. Speech acts from its partner can also be
compared to its experts’ philosophies to improve its expert-selection mechanism. In this way, S++ can be
augmented with the ability to generate and respond to cheap talk. The resulting new algorithm, dubbed S#
(pronounced ‘S sharp’), is depicted in Figure 1 (see Methods and SI.C for details about the algorithm).
We conducted a series of three user studies (see SI.D–F for details) involving 220 participants, who
played in a total of 472 games, to determine the ability of S# to forge cooperative relationships with people.
Representative results are found in the final (culminating) study, in which participants played three repre-
sentative repeated games (drawn from distinct payoff families; see SI.A.3) via a computer interface that hid
the identity of their partner. In some conditions, players could engage in cheap talk by sending messages at
the beginning of each round via the computer interface. Consistent with prior work investigating cheap talk
in repeated games [16], messages were limited to the predetermined speech acts available to S#.
The proportion of mutual cooperation achieved by Human-Human, Human-S#, and S#-S# pairings are
shown in Figures 2a-b. When cheap talk was not permitted, Human-Human and Human-S# pairings did not
frequently result in cooperative relationships. However, across all three games, the presence of cheap talk
doubled the proportion of mutual cooperation experienced by these two pairings. While S#’s speech profile
was distinct from that of humans (Figure 2c), subjective, post-interaction assessments indicate that S# used
cheap talk to promote cooperation as effectively as people (Figure 2d). In fact, many participants were
unable to distinguish S# from a human player (Figure 2e). Together, these results illustrate that, across the
games studied, the combined behavioral and signaling strategies of S# were as effective as those of human
players.
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the underlying experts. Since many of the experts encode high-level ideas (such as trigger strategies), we
can augment S++ with the ability to generate speech acts that describe its intentionality, and to incorporate
speech acts from its partner into its decision-making mechanisms. The resulting new algorithm, dubbed S#
(pronounced ‘S sharp’) is depicted in Figure 5 (see SI for details).
S# differs from S++ in two ways. First, the partner’s proposed plans, signaled via speech acts, are used
to further reduce the set of experts that S# considers selecting (Figure 5-top). Formally, let Econg(t) denote
the set of experts at round t that are congruent with the joint plan proposed by S#’s partner (see SI for how
congruence is computed). Then, S# considers selecting experts from the following set:
E(t) = {ej 2 Econg(t) : ⇢j(t)   ↵(t)}. (3)
If this set is empty (i.e., no desirable options are congruent with the partner’s proposal), E(t) is calculated as
in Eq. (1). Second, S# also extends S++ by generating speech acts that convey the “stream of conscience” of
the algorithm. Specifically, a finite-state machine with output is generated for each expert (Figure 5-bottom).
Given the current state of the expert and game outcomes, the state machine produces speech derived from
a pre-determined set of phrases. These speech acts are game-generic, not tied to a specific to the game.
Speech systems for repeated stochastic games and repeated normal-form games are provided in the SI.
To evaluate the ability of S# to consistently cooperate with people, we conducted a third, 66-participant,
user study in which S# and people interacted in three normal-form games (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken,
and the Alternator Game). The participants were divided into two categories: those that could and could
not communicate. When communication was permitted, players could send messages, limited to the pre-
determined set of speech acts available to S#, to their partner at the beginning of each round. The results
of the study are summarized in Figure 6. When communication was not allowed, the results were similar
to previous studies. However, when communication was possible, mutual cooperation in human-human
and human-S# pairings doubled. Overall, pairings of two S# players produced the highest levels of mutual
cooperation. Together, these results demonstrate the effectiveness of #’s combined learning and speech
systems, which consistently form cooperative relationships with people and other machines.
Potential implications. Our results open the opportunity to study human-machine cooperation in a
way that builds on the rich literature on human cooperation in behavioral economics and evolutionary biol-
ogy [32]. In particular, as machines become increasingly autonomous, we see human-machine cooperation
as a phenomenon that emerges from the interaction among self-interested parties [33], rather than by ex-
plicit design constraints programmed into domain-specific computational systems [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Our results demonstrate that emergent cooperation between humans and autonomous,
self-regarding, machines is now feasible.
While advanced AI algorithms are gaining the ability to consistently learn to cooperate among them-
selves even without communication, human cooperation appears to benefit significantly from signaling. In
light of these findings, greater effort must be placed on developing autonomous machines that can effec-
tively communicate with people, and vice versa, in order to create shared representations [45, 46, 47, 41]
and coordinate quickly on desirable equilibria. Our work emphasizes the importance of this problem, and
presents case studies that others can work from to continue to make progress [46].
Since Alan Turing argued that machines could potentially demonstrate intelligence, AI has been reg-
ularly portrayed as a threat to humanity, paving the way to severe disruption of labor markets [48], or
machine-dominated dystopian futures. The fear of enslavement by machines was encapsulated in a famous
statement by British physician Havelock Ellis in 1922: “The greatest task before civilization at present is
to make machines what they ought to be, the slaves, instead of the masters of men” [49]. Most attempts to
curb this threat have followed the path of hardcoding legal or moral principles into computer code, such as
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Figure 1: An overview of S#, an algorithm that interweaves signaling capabilities into S++ [43]. (a) Prior to beginning
the game, S# uses the description of the game to compute a set E of expert strategies. Each expert encodes a strategy
or learning algorithm that defines behavior over all game states. (b) S# computes the potential, or highest expected
utility, of each expert in E. The potentials are then compared to an aspiration level α(t), which encodes the average
per-round payoff that the algorithm believes is achievable, to determine a set of experts that could potentially meet the
agent’s aspirations. (c) S# determines which experts carry out plans that are congruent with its partner’s last proposed
plan. (d) S# selects an expert (using algorithm S [45, 46]) from among those experts that both potentially meet its
aspirations (step b) and are congruent with its partner’s latest proposal (step c). If E(t) is empty, S# selects its expert
from among the set of experts that meet its aspiration level (step b). The currently selected expert generates signals
based on its game-generic state machine (bottom). Given the current state of the expert and game events, the expert
produces speech from a predetermined list of speech acts. (e) The machine follows the strategy dictated by the selected
expert for m rounds of the repeated game. (f) The machine updates its aspiration level based on the average reward
R it has received over the last m rounds of the game. The experts are also updated according to their own internal
representations. The algorithm then returns to step b. The process repeats for the duration of the repeated game.
Details are given in SI.C. Note that S++ is identical to S# except that S++ (1) replaces step c with Econg(t) = E, and
(2) does not generate speech acts.
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Figure 2: Results of the culminating user study in which 66 volunteer participants (people) were paired with
each other and S# in three representative games (Chicken, Alternator Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma). S#
is identical to S++ when cheap talk is not permitted. Bars and lines show average values over all trials,
while error bars and ribbons show the standard error of the mean. Full details related to sample size and
statistical tests are provided in SI.F. (a) The average proportion of mutual cooperation across all three games
under conditions in which cheap talk between players was either permitted or not permitted. (b) The average
proportion of mutual cooperation over time in each game in each pairing and condition. (c) The average
number of times that Humans and S# used messages of each type over the course of an interaction when
paired with people across all games. For simplicity, the 19 speech acts were grouped into five categories
(see SI.F.1.3). S# tended to use more negative speech acts (labeled Hate and Threats), while people tended
to use more positive speech acts (praise). (d) Results of three post-experiment questions for subjects that
experienced the condition in which cheap talk was permitted. Participants rated (1) the intelligence of their
partner, (2) the clarity of their partner’s intentions, and (3) the usefulness of the communication between
them and their partner. Answers were given on a 5-point Likert Scale. Specific questions and scales are
provided in SI.F. (e) The percentage of time that human participants and S# were thought to be human by
their partner when cheap talk was both permitted and not permitted.
2.2 Distinguishing Algorithmic Mechanisms
Why is S# so successful in forging cooperative relationships with both people and other algorithms? Are
its algorithmic mechanisms fundamentally different from those of other algorithms for repeated games? We
have identified three algorithmic mechanisms responsible for S#’s success. Clearly, Figure 2 demonstrates
that the first of these mechanisms is S#’s ability to generate and respond to relevant signals people can
understand, a trait not present in previous learning algorithms designed for repeated interactions. These
signaling capabilities expand S#’s flexibility in that they also allow S# to more consistently forge cooperative
relationships with people. Figure 3a demonstrates one simple reason that this mechanism is so important:
signals help both S# and humans to more quickly experience mutual cooperation with their partners.
Second, our implementation of S# uses a rich set of experts that includes a variety of equilibrium strate-
gies and even a simple learning algorithm (see SI.C.1). While none of these individual experts has an
overly complex representation (e.g., no expert remembers the full history of play), these experts are more
sophisticated than those traditionally considered (though not explicitly excluded) in the discussion of expert
algorithms [22, 23, 24]. This more sophisticated set of experts permits S# to adapt to a variety of part-
ners and game types, whereas algorithms that rely on a single strategy or a less sophisticated set of experts
are only successful in particular kinds of games played with particular partners [25] (Figure 3c). Thus, in
general, simplifying S# by removing experts from this set will tend to limit the algorithm’s flexibility and
generality, though doing so will not always negatively impact its performance when paired with particular
associates in particular games.
Finally, S#’s somewhat non-conventional expert-selection mechanism (see Eq. 1) is central to its success.
While techniques such as ε-greedy exploration (e.g., EEE) and regret-matching (e,g., Exp3) have permeated
algorithm development in the AI community, S# instead uses an expert-selection mechanism closely aligned
with recognition-primed decision making [26]. Given the same full, rich set of experts, more traditional
expert-selection mechanisms establish effective relationships in far fewer scenarios than S# (Figure 3c).
Figures 3a-b provide insights into why this is so. Compared to the other expert-selection mechanisms, S#
has a greater combined ability to quickly establish a cooperative relationship with its partner (Figure 3a) and
then to maintain it (Figure 3b), a condition brought about by S#’s tendency to not deviate from cooperation
after mutual cooperation has been established (i.e., loyalty).
The loyalty brought about by S#’s expert-selection mechanism helps explain why S#-S# pairings sub-
stantially outperformed Human-Human pairings in our study (Figure 2a-b). S#’s superior performance can
be attributed to two human tendencies. First, while S# did not typically deviate from cooperation after
successive rounds of mutual cooperation (Figure 3b), many human players did. Almost universally, such
deviations led to reduced payoffs to the deviator. Second, a sizable portion of our participants failed to keep
some of their verbal commitments. On the other hand, since S#’s verbal commitments are derived from
its intended future behavior, it typically carries out the plans it proposes. Had participants followed S#’s
strategy in these two regards, Human-Human pairings would have performed nearly as well, on average, as
S#-S# pairings (Figure 3d – see SI.F.4 for details).
2.3 Repeated Stochastic Games
The previous results were demonstrated for normal-form games. However, S++ also learns effectively in
repeated stochastic games [27], which are more complex scenarios in which a round consists of a sequence
of moves by both players. In these games, S++ is distinguished, again, by its ability to adapt to many
different machine associates in a variety of different scenarios [27]. As in normal-form games, S++ can be
augmented with cheap talk to form S#. While S++ does not consistently forge effective relationships with
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Figure 3: (a) Empirically generated cumulative distribution functions for the number of rounds required
for pairings to experience two consecutive rounds of mutual cooperation across three different repeated
games (Chicken, Alternator Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma). Per-game results are provided in SI.F. For
machine-machine pairings, the results are obtained from 50 trials conducted in each game, whereas pairings
with humans use results from a total of 36 different pairings each. (b) The percentage of partnerships for
each pairing that did not deviate from mutual cooperation once the players experienced two consecutive
rounds of mutual cooperation across the same three repeated games. (c) The percentage of game types
(payoff family× game length) and partners (25 different algorithms) against which various algorithms were
ranked in the top 2 (among the 25 different algorithms considered) with respect to payoffs received. See
SI.B.5 for details. (d) The estimated proportion of rounds that would have resulted in mutual cooperation
had all human players followed S#’s learned behavioral and signaling strategies of (1) not deviating from
cooperative behavior when mutual cooperation was established (i.e., Loyal) and (2) following through with
verbal commitments (i.e., Honest). See SI.F.4 for details. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Had all human participants been loyal and honest, these results indicate that there would have been little
difference between Human-Human and S#-S# pairings.
people in these more complex scenarios, our results show that S# does. Representative results are shown
in Figure 4, which considers a turning-taking scenario in which two players must learn how to share a set
of blocks. Like people, S# uses cheap talk to substantially increase its payoffs when associating with other
people in this game (Figure 4b). These results mirror those we observe in normal-form games (compare
Figures 4b and 2b). See SI.E for additional details and results.
3 Discussion
Our studies of human-S# partnerships were limited to five repeated games, selected carefully to represent
different classes of games from the periodic table of games (see SI.A.3). Though future work should address
more scenarios, S#’s success in establishing cooperative relationships with people in these representative
games, along with its consistently high performance across all classes of 2x2 games and various repeated
stochastic games [27] when associating with other algorithms, gives us some confidence that these results
will generalize to many other scenarios.
Since Alan Turing envisioned Artificial Intelligence, major milestones have focused on defeating hu-
mans in zero-sum encounters [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. However, in many scenarios, successful machines must co-
operate with, rather than compete against, humans and other machines, even in the midst of conflicting
interests and threats of being exploited. Our work demonstrates how autonomous machines can learn to
establish cooperative relationships with people and other machines in repeated interactions. We showed that
human-machine and machine-machine cooperation is achievable using a non-trivial, but ultimately simple,
set of algorithmic mechanisms. These mechanisms include computing a variety of expert strategies opti-
mized for various scenarios, a particular meta-strategy for a particular meta-strategy for selecting experts to
follow, and the ability to generate and respond to simple signals. We hope that this first extensive demon-
stration of human cooperation with autonomous machines in repeated games will spur significant further
research that will ensure that autonomous machines, designed to carry out human endeavors, will cooperate
with humanity.
4 Methods
Detailed methods and analysis are provided in the SI. In this section, we overview three different aspects of
these methods and analysis: the benchmark of games used to compare algorithms and people, results from
our comparison of AI algorithms, and a description of S#.
4.1 Benchmark Games for Studying Cooperation
As with all historical grand challenges in AI, it is important to identify a class of benchmark problems to
compare the performance of different algorithms. When it comes to human cooperation, a fundamental
benchmark has been 2×2, general-sum, repeated games [28]. This class of games has been a workhorse for
decades in the fields of behavioral economics [29], mathematical biology [30], psychology [31], sociology
[32], computer science [33], and political science [34]. These fields have revealed many aspects of human
cooperative behavior through canonical games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Chicken, Battle of the
Sexes, and the Stag Hunt. Such games, therefore, provide a well-established, extensively studied, and widely
understood benchmark for studying the capabilities of machines to develop cooperative relationships.
The periodic table of 2× 2 games (Figure 5; see SI.A.3; [28, 35, 36, 37, 38]) identifies and categorizes
144 unique game structures that present many unique scenarios in which machines may need to cooperate.
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Figure 4: In addition to evaluating algorithms in normal-form games, we also evaluated people and algorithms in
repeated stochastic games (including extensive-form games). Results are provided in SI.E. (a) An extensive-form
game in which two players share a nine-piece block set. The two players take turns selecting blocks from the set until
each has three blocks. The goal of each player is to get a valid set of blocks with the highest value possible, where
the value of a set is determined by the sum of the numbers on the blocks. Invalid sets receive negative points. (1) A
fair, but inefficient outcome in which both players receive 18 points. (2) An unequal outcome in which one player
receives 40 points, while the other player receives just 10 points. However, when the players take turns getting the
higher payoff (selecting all the squares), this is the Nash bargaining solution of the game, producing an average payoff
of 25 to both players. (3) An outcome in which neither player obtains a valid set, and hence both players lose points.
(4) This particular negative outcome is brought about when player 2 defects against player 1 by taking the block that
player 1 needs to complete its (most-valuable) set. (5) Player 1 then retaliates to ensure that player 2 does not get a
valid set either. (b) Average payoffs obtained by people and S#- (an early version of S# that generates, but does not
respond to, cheap talk) when associating with people in the extensive-form game depicted in a. As in normal-form
games, S#- successfully uses cheap talk to consistently forge cooperative relationships with people in this repeated
stochastic game. For more details see SI.E. (c) We also implemented S#- on a Nao robot to play the Block Game with
people.
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Figure 5: We compared algorithms across the periodic table of 2x2 games based on the topology of Robinson
and Goforth [37] for scenarios in which the players exhibit a strict ordinal preference ordering over the four
game outcomes (specified by the values 1, 2, 3, and 4). For each game, the pure-strategy one-shot Nash
equilibria (NEs) are given in bold-face type. The solutions played in the Nash bargaining solution (NBS [47]
– i.e., the mutually cooperative solution) given the payoff values 1, 2, 3, and 4 are also highlighted, though
the frequency at which each solution is played is not specified. Note that since the NBS depends on the
actual payoffs and not just the preference ordering, other NBSs are possible for each game structure. The
figure is adapted from the graphic developed by Bruns [38].
We use this set of game structures as a benchmark against which to compare the abilities of algorithms
to cooperate. Successful algorithms should be able to forge successful relationships with both people and
machines across all of these repeated games. In particular, we can use these games to quantify the abilities
of various state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms to satisfy the aforementioned properties: generality
across games, flexibility across opponent types (including humans), and speed of learning.
Like the majority of work in repeated interactions, we focus on two-player normal-form games to more
easily understand how machines can forge cooperative relationships with people. Nevertheless, we are
interested in algorithms that can also be used in more complex interactions, including the more general case
of repeated (two-player) stochastic games (see, for example, Figure 4). Studies evaluating the ability of S#
to forge cooperative relationships with people in repeated stochastic games have yielded similar results to
those we report for two-player normal-form games (e.g., Figure 4b). These studies are described in SI.E.
4.2 Interacting with Other Machines: AI Algorithms for Repeated Interactions
With the goal of identifying successful algorithmic mechanisms for playing arbitrary repeated games, we se-
lected and evaluated 25 existing algorithms (see Figure 6a) with respect to six different performance metrics
(see SI.B.2) across the periodic table of 2x2 games. These representative algorithms included classical al-
gorithms such as (generalized) generous tit-for-tat (i.e., GODFATHER) and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) [39],
evolutionarily evolved memory-one and memory-two stochastic strategies [40], machine-learning algo-
rithms (including reinforcement learning), belief-based algorithms [41], and expert algorithms [42, 43].
Results of this evaluation are summarized in Figure 6a. Detailed analysis is provided in SI.B. We
make two high-level observations. First, it is interesting to observe which algorithms were less successful
in these evaluations. For instance, while generalized tit-for-tat, WSLS, and memory-one and memory-
two stochastic strategies (e.g., MEM-1 and MEM-2) are successful in prisoner’s dilemmas, they are not
consistently effective across the full set of 2x2 games. These algorithms are particularly ineffective in
longer interactions, as they do not effectively adapt to their associate’s behavior. Additionally, algorithms
that minimize regret (e.g., Exp3 [22], GIGA-WoLF [23], and WMA [24]), which is the central component
of world-champion computer poker algorithms [9], also performed poorly.
Second, while many algorithms had high performance with respect to some measure, only S++ [43]
was a top-performing algorithm across all metrics at all game lengths. Furthermore, it maintained this
high performance in each class of game and when associating with each class of algorithm (see SI.B.5).
S++ learns to cooperate with like-minded associates, exploit weaker competition, and bound its worst-case
performance (Figure 6b). Perhaps most importantly, whereas many machine-learning algorithms do not
learn cooperative behavior until after thousands of rounds of interaction (if at all), S++ tends to do so within
relatively few rounds of interaction (Figure 6c), likely fast enough to support interactions with people.
4.3 S#: A Machine-Learning Algorithm that Talks
S# is derived from S++ [43], an expert algorithm that combines and builds on decades of research in com-
puter science, economics, and the behavioral and social sciences. S++ uses the description of the game
environment to compute a diverse set of experts, each of which uses distinct mathematics and assumptions
to produce a strategy over the entire space of the game. S++ then uses a meta-level control strategy based
on aspiration learning [44, 45, 46] to dynamically reduce this set of experts. Formally, let E denote the set
of experts computed by S++. In each epoch (beginning in round t), S++ computes the potential ρj(t) of
each expert ej ∈ E, and compares this potential with its aspiration level α(t) to form a reduced set E(t) of
Algorithm Round-Robin % Best Worst-Case Replicator Group-1 Group-2 Rank SummaryAverage Score Score Dynamic Tourney Tourney Best – Mean – Worst
S++ 1, 1, 1 2, 1, 2 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 2 1, 1, 1 1 – 1.2 – 2
MANIPULATOR 3, 2, 3 4, 3, 8 5, 2, 4 6, 4, 3 5, 3, 3 5, 2, 2 2 – 3.7 – 8
BULLY 3, 2, 1 3, 2, 1 7, 13, 20 7, 3, 2 6, 2, 1 6, 3, 5 1 – 4.8 – 20
S++/SIMPLE 5, 4, 4 8, 5, 9 4, 6, 10 10, 2, 6 8, 4, 6 9, 4, 6 2 – 6.1 – 10
S 5, 5, 8 6, 7, 10 3, 3, 8 5, 5, 8 7, 5, 9 7, 5, 9 3 – 6.4 – 10
FICT. PLAY 2, 8, 14 1, 6, 10 2, 8, 16 3, 12, 15 2, 8, 12 4, 9, 14 1 – 8.1 – 16
MBRL-1 6, 6, 10 5, 4, 7 8, 7, 14 11, 11, 13 9, 7, 10 8, 7, 10 4 – 8.5 – 14
EEE 11, 8, 7 14, 9, 5 9, 4, 2 14, 10, 9 13, 9, 8 13, 10, 8 2 – 9.1 – 14
MBRL-2 14, 5, 5 13, 8, 6 19, 5, 3 18, 9, 4 18, 6, 5 18, 6, 4 3 – 9.2 – 19
MEM-1 6, 9, 13 7, 10, 21 6, 9, 17 2, 6, 10 3, 10, 17 2, 8, 15 2 – 9.5 – 21
M-QUBED 14, 20, 4 15, 20, 3 15, 19, 5 17, 19, 5 17, 21, 4 16, 21, 3 3 – 13.2 – 21
MEM-2 9, 11, 20 9, 11, 22 13, 17, 22 4, 13, 19 4, 13, 25 3, 12, 20 3 – 13.7 – 25
MANIP-GF 11, 11, 21 12, 12, 19 12, 11, 19 9, 7, 20 12, 14, 20 11, 13, 21 7 – 14.2 – 21
WOLF-PHC 17, 11, 13 18, 14, 14 18, 14, 18 16, 14, 14 16, 11, 11 15, 11, 11 11 – 14.2 – 18
QL 17, 17, 7 19, 19, 4 17, 18, 7 19, 18, 7 19, 20, 7 19, 18, 7 4 – 14.4 – 20
GTFT (GODFATHER) 11, 14, 22 11, 15, 20 11, 16, 23 8, 8, 22 10, 16, 21 10, 15, 22 8 – 15.3 – 23
EEE/SIMPLE 20, 15, 11 20, 17, 12 20, 10, 9 20, 16, 11 24, 15, 14 20, 16, 13 9 – 15.7 – 24
EXP3 19, 23, 11 16, 23, 15 16, 23, 6 15, 23, 12 15, 25, 13 17, 25, 12 6 – 17.2 – 25
CJAL 24, 14, 14 25, 14, 13 24, 12, 15 24, 17, 16 20, 12, 16 22, 14, 16 12 – 17.3 – 25
WSLS 9, 17, 24 10, 16, 24 10, 20, 24 12, 20, 24 11, 17, 24 12, 17, 25 9 – 17.6 – 25
GIGA-WOLF 14, 19, 23 17, 18, 23 14, 15, 21 13, 15, 23 14, 18, 22 14, 19, 23 13 – 18.1 – 23
WMA 21, 21, 15 21, 21, 16 22, 21, 12 22, 21, 17 21, 19, 15 23, 20, 17 12 – 19.2 – 23
STOCH. FP 21, 21, 15 22, 22, 17 23, 22, 11 23, 22, 18 25, 24, 18 25, 22, 18 11 – 20.5 – 25
EXP3/SIMPLE 21, 24, 16 23, 24, 18 21, 24, 13 21, 24, 21 22, 22, 19 21, 23, 19 13 – 20.9 – 24
RANDOM 24, 25, 25 24, 25, 25 25, 25, 25 25, 25, 25 23, 23, 23 24, 24, 24 23 – 24.4 – 25
(a) Rankings of algorithms across six different metrics at three different game lengths
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(b) Illustration of S++’s learning dynamics in
Chicken
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(c) Self play in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Figure 6: Selected results comparing the performance of representative algorithms across the periodic table of 2x2
games (Figure 5; see also SI.A.3) when paired with other algorithms. (a) The rankings of 25 algorithms with respect
to six performance metrics (see SI.B.2). A lower rank indicates higher performance. For each metric, the algorithms
are ranked in 100-round, 1000-round, and 50,000-round games, respectively. Example: the 3-tuple 3, 2, 1 indicates
the algorithm was ranked 3rd, 2nd, and 1st in 100, 1000, and 50,000-round games, respectively. (b) An illustration
of S++’s learning dynamics in Chicken. For ease of understanding, experts are categorized into groups (see SI.C).
Top-left: When (unknowingly) paired with an agent that uses the same algorithm, S++ initially seeks to bully its
associate, but then switches to fair, cooperative experts when attempts to exploit are unsuccessful. Top-right: When
paired with BULLY, S++ learns the best response, which is to be bullied, achieved by playing MBRL-1, Bully-L,
or Bully-F. Bottom-left: S++ quickly learns to play experts that bully MBRL-2. Bottom-right: On the other hand,
algorithm S does not learn to consistently bully MBRL-2, showing that S++’s pruning rule (Eq. 1) enables it to teach
MBRL-2 to accept being bullied, thus producing high payoffs for S++. These results are averaged over 50 trials each.
(c) The average per-round payoffs of various machine-learning algorithms over time in self play in a traditional (0-1-
3-5)-Prisoner’s Dilemma in which mutual cooperation produces a payoff of 3 and mutual defection produces a payoff
of 1. Results are the averages of 50 trials. Among the machine-learning algorithms we evaluated, S++ is unique in its
ability to quickly form successful relationships with other algorithms across the set of 2x2 games.
experts:
E(t) = {ej ∈ E : ρj(t) ≥ α(t)}. (1)
This reduced set consists of the experts that S++ believes could potentially produce satisfactory payoffs. It
then selects one expert esel(t) ∈ E(t) using a satisficing decision rule [45, 46]. Over the next m rounds, it
follows the strategy prescribed by esel(t), after which it updates its aspiration level as follows:
α(t+m)← λmα(t) + (1− λm)R, (2)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the learning rate and R is the average payoff obtained by S++ in the last m rounds. It
also updates each expert ej ∈ E based on its peculiar reasoning mechanism, and then begins a new epoch.
These results demonstrate the ability of S++ to effectively establish and maintain profitable long-term
relationships with machines in arbitrary repeated games. Does S++ also learn to form cooperative relation-
ships with people?
S# differs from S++ in two ways. First, the partner’s proposed plans, signaled via speech acts, are used
to further reduce the set of experts that S# considers selecting (Figure 1c). Formally, let Econg(t) denote the
set of experts in round t that are congruent with the last joint plan proposed by S#’s partner (see SI.C.2.2).
Then, S# considers selecting experts from the following set:
E(t) = {ej ∈ Econg(t) : ρj(t) ≥ α(t)}. (3)
If this set is empty (i.e., no desirable options are congruent with the partner’s proposal), E(t) is calculated as
in Eq. (1). Second, S# also extends S++ by generating speech acts that convey the “stream of consciousness”
of the algorithm (Figure 1d). Specifically, a finite-state machine with output is generated for each expert.
Given the state of the expert and the game outcomes, the state machine of the currently selected expert
produces speech derived from a predetermined set of phrases. The set of speech acts, which are largely
game-generic (though some adaptations must be made for multi-stage games; see SI.E.3.4) allows S# to
provide feedback to its partner, make threats, provide various explanations to manage the relationship, and
propose and agree to plans.
See SI.C for an in-depth description of S#.
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